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Full text available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/0700000066 Abstract Game Theory (GT), both in its non-cooperative (NCGT) and cooperative (CGT) forms, has been pivotal in its contribution to the analysis of important aspects related to water resources. The 1942 seminal work of Ransmeier on The Tennessee Valley Authority is still considered essential; it continues to inspire many applications related to water allocation decisions. Since Ransmeier, GT models were developed and have been applied to various aspects of water management, such as decisions on cost and benefit allocation in multi-objective multi-use water projects, conflicts and joint management of irrigation projects, management of groundwater aquifers, hydropower facilities, urban water supplies, wastewater treatment plants, and transboundary water disputes.
World water resources face new challenges that suggest a renewed role for GT in water management. Scarcity, growing populations, and massive development have led to increased competition over water resources and subsequent elevated pollution levels. Climate change is expected to unevenly affect the hydrological cycle, leading to increased variability in water supplies across time and space and uncertainty in water allocation decisions. Future investments in water resource projects will be astronomical, needing much more stable rules for cost allocations among participating entities and over time. Levels of water disputes may vary from local to regional, state, and international levels. All of these suggest that while GT models and applications to water resources have advanced over the years, much more is expected.
This monograph will review the main contributions of GT in water resources over the past 70 years. It will compare the set of issues faced by water resources and those which the sector is most likely to face in the coming future. Based on this comparison, a future research agenda and priorities will be proposed. Following the literature's time line with a focus on various methodologies, sectoral applications (such as irrigation, hydropower, environmental water uses, navigation, etc.), and regional issues, we will also identify physical and behavioral features in the water sector that might be conducive to GT (such as scarcity, externality, uncertainty, and competition-conflict) and some features of intervention (such as the important role for policy, regulation, and incentives), which all affect the likelihood of GT solutions in terms of acceptability and stability.
Introduction
The use of Game Theory (GT) to address water resource management issues has been ever increasing since the 1942 seminal application by Ransmeier [1942] to the Tennessee Valley Authority investment project. 1 As is described in Guillermo Owen [1982] , the seeds for the development of today's GT were planted in the work by Zermelo [1913] and were advanced to the understanding that economic situations can be modeled as games by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] . GT applications were further developed for logistical purposes during World War II. GT has become one of the basic analytical tools for addressing strategic issues in many fields, including water resources. Following the various applications of GT in water resources over the past half century suggests that it traced a path similar to the state-ofwater and water development in the world. This path will be described and analyzed in Section 2 of this monograph. Initially we want to distinguish water resources from other applications of GT.
What makes water an appropriate medium for the application of GT? We will suggest several aspects embedded in water and its interaction with society that make it perfect for GT analysis. First, water
Introduction is a scarce resource that creates tension between competing users and uses. Conflicts between sectors that need water at different periods during the year, such as irrigation and hydropower are common [Moller, 2005] . In many situations water is characterized as a common pool resource (CPR), opening the door for strategic behavior of the users. Secondly and mostly related, water resources are subject to various types of externalities. One type of externality, the congestion externality, is associated with the CPR nature of water (e.g., groundwater). Another type of externality of water is associated with pollution and is most prominent when upstream-downstream relations prevail. Third, water is associated to a greater extent with uncertainty and asymmetry of information, thus reflecting on the strategic behavior of the agents involved.
Some other reasons for the strategic nature of water can be explained by the fact that not all players 'behave' strictly as profit maximizers. Water is seen by various individuals not only as a production resource but also as a source for spiritual needs with existence value. Therefore, 'optimal' prescriptions for social arrangements may not be acceptable for various groups in the society. For that reason, most water conflicts involve multi-party multi-objective solutions, and thus the incorporation of strategic behavior considerations, as GT can offer, is essential for socially acceptable arrangements. Such reasons provided the motivation for our work.
The use of GT in water resources by different disciplinary professions such as engineers, international relations experts, economists, and geographers, to name a few, is indeed impressive. The objective of this monograph is to collect the vast literature, catalogue it, and provide present and future practitioners of Game Theory in water resources with a source of information that can be useful for their research. For the sake of conserving space we kept the text explaining GT concepts to a minimum. We assume that readers of this monograph have the basic skills in GT. In places, we provide references to conceptual works for readers who might need help in understanding the relevant GT concepts.
Several databases and Google Scholar were iteratively used to gather literature for this review. Search terms were adjusted according to the vocabularies of each database and the results were analyzed and categorized. An attempt to analyze text using an automated text analyzer failed. For further details, please see Annex 1.
The monograph will be developed as follows. In Section 2, we report the historical trends observed in the accumulation of the GT publications on water between 1942 and 2013. Such trends indicate dynamics of relative importance of sectors and topics over time. They may be connected to global events or crises that took place in the world. Detecting such trends may be useful in explaining the relevance of GT to issues in water around the world. Section 3 describes the developments in Cooperative GT-methodologies to water issues. Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) applications ruled the GT applications during the period . Section 4 reviews the development of Non-Cooperative GT (NCGT) methodologies to various water issues. Then NCGT became more prominent in dealing with water-related issues that involve third parties. Section 5 provides a comprehensive review of GT surveys that have been published in the literature. Section 6 reviews Game Theory applications by sub-sector. We identified 11 sub-sectors and reviewed the applications of GT approaches to each of them. In total, this monograph reviews 289 publications that are directly or indirectly applied to water related issues. We end the monograph in Section 7 with a conclusion and identification of remaining problems to be addressed in the future. C. M. Dufournaud and J. J. Harrington. Temporal and spatial distribution of benefits and costs in river-basin schemes: a cooperative game approach. Environment and Planning A, 22:615-628, 1990. 
